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ome obligations we create by declaration, by the exercise of norma-
tive power. In the case of a promise, we do so by communicating 
the intention of hereby undertaking an obligation. In the case of a 
command, we do so by communicating the intention of hereby binding 
someone else to perform. Or so I shall assume. Call these voluntary obliga-
tions. As I use the term, a voluntary obligation is not merely an obligation 
that results from our choice, nor even from our choice of an obligation. 
A voluntary obligation is the result of a specific form of choice – namely 
the decision to communicate the intention of hereby binding someone to 
perform. Of course, there are various ways in which declarations or exer-
cises of normative power may fail at their purpose but the fact that the 
speaker intended to bind someone by declaration is often crucial to their 
being so bound.  
The claim that such a declaration could ever generate an obligation 
has been disputed.1 Here I join other authors in assuming that normative 
power is a reality and so voluntary obligations do exist, but I shall also be 
assuming that many obligations are not in this sense voluntary. For ex-
ample, parents are bound to feed their children regardless of promise, 
command or any other form of declaration. And this raises a question: 
how do voluntary obligations relate to involuntary obligations? In par-
ticular, can one have a voluntary obligation to do something that is invol-
untarily forbidden? Here I am mainly interested in promises and thus in 
whether one can bind oneself to do what one is involuntarily obliged not 
to do, but I shall also ask whether another can put me in this position by 
issuing a valid order.2 
At one extreme is the view that, while declaration may create volun-
tary obligations where none previously existed, it can do so only within 
the limits laid down by our involuntary obligations. That is the view taken 
by advocates of what I shall call the “natural right theory” of promissory 
obligation (see section 3). At the other extreme is the view (toward which 
I myself now incline) that the content of binding promises and valid 
commands is not constrained by our involuntary obligations as such.3 
There is a related issue about whether our present voluntary obligations 
are restricted by those we have previously assumed (e.g., our past promis-
es). I shall consider the latter issue in the second section and the former 
in the third but before getting down to business, we need a clearer view 
of what it is to be bound by an obligation.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This dispute explains the menu of theories of voluntary obligation considered in this 
paper. For example, I ignore expectational theories of promissory obligation that deny 
that promises are the products of normative power. For consideration of these theories, 
see Owens (2012, ch. 9). 
2 Thus, an order imposes a voluntary obligation on me even though it is not I who 
chooses it. 
3 On this point, my own views have changed. Compare Owens (2006: 72, n.28) with 
Owens 2012 (section 48). 
S 
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1. Obligation 
 
How one thinks about conflict of obligation will inevitably depend on 
how one thinks about obligation itself, and there is no way of setting up 
the debate about the former without making claims about the latter, 
claims that some will dispute.4 In this section, I describe three marks of 
obligation. A mark of obligation is a condition that any obligation must 
satisfy and furthermore a condition that helps to differentiate an obliga-
tion from other considerations that might persuade one to act. I shall fur-
ther assume that these three marks suffice to differentiate obligations 
from all other practical considerations, so that any practical consideration 
that bears them constitutes an obligation. But the issue as to whether 
practical considerations bearing these marks can conflict is, I maintain, of 
theoretical interest whether or not they all constitute obligations. (For 
example, we need to settle whether you might find yourself in a situation 
in which guilt will be apt whatever you do.) So those who doubt that the 
presence of these three marks is enough for obligation may still engage 
with the argument of the next three sections. 
So what is distinctive of obligation? I will start with the following 
claim: it makes sense for you to do something simply because you think 
yourself obliged to do it. If you think yourself bound by your promise to 
go on holiday with me, then it makes sense for you to go on holiday with 
me even though you can see nothing else to be said for so doing, do not 
feel like going and so forth. Intentional activity is activity that makes 
sense at least to its agent, activity with some apparent point, and your 
promise is enough to give your traveling with me a point. This is our first 
mark of obligation. 
Now various considerations can make sense of our activities. What is 
special about obligations? Obligations do not just recommend fulfillment, 
do not just count in favor of fulfillment – they demand it. A demand 
does not leave it up to you to weigh all the considerations that favor ful-
fillment against those recommending breach. To comply with a demand 
is not merely to do what is demanded, it is to decide to do what is de-
manded without considering a certain range of factors recommending 
nonfulfillment. A conscientious person would not act on these considera-
tions and so they are to be excluded from any practical deliberations you 
conduct on the point. So, for example, a fully conscientious promisor 
would not seriously consider the attractions of a subsequent invitation 
when determining whether to holiday with me as promised. They would 
not weigh the charms of this alternative entertainment against the need to 
keep their promise. They would exclude these charms from their practical 
deliberations. This is our second mark of obligation.5 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The claims about obligation made in this section are all defended at greater length in 
Owens (2012, ch. 3). 
5 On obligation and exclusion, see Owens (2012: 85-95) and Raz (1999: 35-48). If obli-
gations can indeed conflict, the excluded considerations may well include other obliga-
tions. 
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Thus far we have it that binding obligations make sense of perfor-
mance and furthermore they make sense of your excluding various con-
siderations counting against performance from your deliberations. Not 
that the promise excludes anything at all that counts against fulfillment: if 
I suffer a moderately serious injury just as I am about to leave for our 
holiday, I should indeed consider my health in determining whether to 
keep my promise to you. And if I determine that these nonexcluded con-
siderations justify nonfulfillment, then the promise no longer binds me 
and I am not wronging you when I fail to go. On the other hand, sup-
pose the injury (though nonexcluded) is not especially serious and would 
not by itself justify breach but the other (excluded) attractions of the al-
ternative holiday are both strong and unaffected by the injury. Here holi-
daying with you may be inadvisable in the light of the full range of rele-
vant considerations, both excluded and nonexcluded: I would be justified 
in breaching my obligation. Nevertheless, I am wronging you if I do not 
go because I am acting on considerations that my promise excludes. Here 
it would make sense for me to go (despite my injury) even though I 
would be justified in breaching. 
Have we exhausted the practical significance of obligation? Do I not 
also have a positive reason to do what I am obliged to do, a fact not ob-
viously captured just by saying (a) that it makes sense for me to do it and 
(b) that it makes sense for me to exclude various conflicting considera-
tions from my deliberations about whether to do it? To put it another 
way, if I am really obliged to do it, does that not provide at least some 
grounds for thinking that I ought to do it? There are a range of positions 
here, the most extreme of which is the view that I am not really obliged 
to A unless I ought to do A, all things considered. Now if being obliged 
to A did indeed imply that one ought to do A, that one had sufficient rea-
son to do it, then it would follow that obligations could not make con-
flicting demands on us, for it surely cannot be the case that we ought to 
do A and ought also to refrain. True, I might be justified in either eating 
an ice cream or not eating it as I please (here I am “rationally permitted” 
to do either) but when on the whole I ought to be eating an ice cream, it 
cannot also be the case that on the whole I ought not to be eating it (and 
vice versa). 
We should follow Hart in resisting this view: 
 
There is no contradiction or other impropriety in saying “I have an obligation 
to do X, someone has a right to ask me to, but I now see I ought not to do it.” 
It will in painful situations sometimes be the lesser of two moral evils to disre-
gard what really are people’s rights and not perform our obligations to them. 
This seems to me particularly obvious from the case of promises: I may prom-
ise to do something and thereby incur an obligation just because that is one 
way in which obligations (to be distinguished from other forms of moral rea-
sons for acting) are created; reflection may show that it would in the circum-
stances be wrong to keep this promise because of the suffering it might cause, 
and we can express this by saying “I ought not to do it though I have an obli-
gation to him to do it” (Hart 1955: 186). 
 
JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY | VOL. 11, NO. 1 
PROMISES AND CONFLICTING OBLIGATIONS 
David Owens 
	   4 
Hart’s point here is that there is a notion of obligation, one familiar from 
ordinary life, that is not tied to what one ought to do tout court. This pre-
theoretical notion is theoretically interesting because it both bears the 
marks of obligation that I am currently outlining and appears to leave 
room for conflicts of obligation. Whether there are other (perhaps theo-
retically motivated) notions of obligation on which the fact that you are 
obliged to do something entails that you ought to do it is not a matter I 
shall discuss. 
One might think that one ought to do what one is obliged to do be-
cause the function of obligation is to guide action and an adequate guide 
will not give advice that should not be followed.6 But action guidance 
need not take this decisive form. For example, a genuine obligation may 
give me a weighty reason to fulfill it, a reason I might be justified in set-
ting aside, but only in extremis. Unlike its predecessor, this view does not 
exclude the possibility of conflict of obligation but it does give all such 
conflicts a tragic aspect.7 This overdramatizes the phenomenon. When I 
must choose between breaking my promise to have lunch with you or 
leaving my child to wait around for a lift home from school, neither you 
nor my child faces any great sacrifice, but an obligation must be breached 
nonetheless. The truth is that some genuine obligations are quite trivial 
because the interests they protect are relatively unimportant (e.g., my duty 
to avoid a minor invasion of your personal space).8 Where obligations 
strongly recommend performance, that is not simply because of their 
character as obligations but rather because of the weight of the interests 
they protect, and this is as true of promissory obligations as of any other.  
Still, must obligations justify their fulfillment to at least some degree? 
Must there be some reason to fulfill any genuine obligation, some case 
for thinking that one ought to do what one is obliged to do? Whether this 
is so will depend on whether we can, merely by declaration, make it the 
case that something ought to be done (other things being equal). Since a 
positive answer would do nothing to rule out conflicts of obligation, I 
here remain agnostic, resting content with the claim that a promise can 
make sense of your doing something (i.e., can enable you to do it inten-
tionally) by obliging you to do it.  
We are not yet done with the marks of obligation. Obligation bears 
not only on how we should deliberate, it also affects how the agent and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Thomson calls this the Simplifying Idea and rejects it. She agrees with Hart that one can 
be obliged to do what one ought not to do and maintains that, while obligations may 
conflict, oughts may not (Thomson 1990: 82-87). On the other hand, Thomson seems 
to think that if you ought to breach a promise then it follows that it is “permissible” for 
you to breach that promise, even though the promisee still has a “claim” against you 
(98). In my opinion, the notion of permissibility suffers from an unhelpful ambiguity. 
An action may be permissible in the sense that it is not the case that one ought not to do 
it, while also being impermissible in the sense that one wrongs someone by doing it, 
guilt is apt and so forth. 
7 In his influential papers about moral dilemmas, Williams foregrounded tragic choices, 
choices that are hard to make in that they are both hard to get right and hard on those 
affected by the choice (e.g., Williams 1973: 173). Neither feature is crucial to my discus-
sion. 
8 On this point, see Raz (1977: 223) and Wolf (2015: 244-46). 
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others should react to what is done. Suppose the agent breaches a bind-
ing obligation. Then ceteris paribus we would expect the agent to feel guilty 
and others to blame them for the breach. Guilt and blame are, in general, 
appropriate reactions to breach of promise.9 (Indeed guilt and blame may 
be in place even where the promisor consulted their own convenience 
and performed for the wrong reason.) And wherever blame and guilt are 
in place, the issue of forgiveness arises: the promisor can ask for it and 
the promisee can dispense it because the promisor wronged the promi-
see. 
Does this third mark of obligation throw any doubt on the possibil-
ity of conflict of obligation? Again, various claims might be made. The 
most extreme is that one simply cannot be in a position where, whatever 
one does, it is appropriate to feel guilty about doing it and so conflict of 
obligation is impossible. Again, the extreme view is implausible: when I 
have knowingly borrowed more than I can repay, should I not feel guilty 
toward (and require forgiveness from) whomever I end up failing to re-
pay? More plausible is the idea that I can find myself in such a situation 
only when I am at fault: I should not have borrowed so much money.10 
Perhaps I ought now to repay X rather than Y but since I got myself into 
this bind, I lack any justification for letting Y down and am to blame 
whatever I do. This more moderate view allows that our reactive attitudes 
can conflict but only because, at some point, we did not discharge our 
obligations: a conscientious person will never find themselves in this situ-
ation. In what follows, I shall urge that even this weaker claim is too 
strong. One can have conflicting obligations through no fault of one’s 
own and so can be bound to do something (e.g., keep a promise) that one 
is fully justified in not doing. 
It might be urged that, in addition to the above marks of obligation, 
performance of an obligation must also be owed to someone, someone 
who is wronged by nonperformance. This is extremely plausible in the 
case of promissory obligations: the promisor owes performance of the 
promise to the promisee, and breach of a binding promise always wrongs 
the promisee. One mark of the latter is that the promisee is in a position 
to forgive the breach. Nor does this fact throw any doubt on the possibil-
ity of conflicting obligations: as already indicated, you can be so situated 
that whatever you do you will wrong someone by breaching a promise 
you have made them. Though I shall indeed be assuming that breach of 
promise is a wrong that takes the form of a wronging, I shall not write 
this feature into the very notion of an obligation because I am doubtful 
that all breaches of obligation involve wronging someone, but this feature 
could be included without affecting the argument of the paper.11 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 These claims invite multiple qualifications: the promisor has an excuse (e.g., is very 
depressed) or else we all have better things to worry about and so forth. I will take such 
qualifications as read. 
10 This is the position taken by Foot (2002: 48) and Thomson (1990: 97). 
11 In particular, I want to leave it open whether failure to obey an order wrongs the au-
thority that issues the order (or indeed anyone else). 
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From here on, the concept of obligation outlined above is taken as 
the basis for discussion and the three marks of obligation are used to test 
claims about the possibility or impossibility of conflict of obligation. 
Consulting our intuitions about particular cases is not the only test avail-
able. We might also ask a more theoretical question: what is the basis of 
our normative powers and why should the obligations they purportedly 
generate be taken at all seriously? Writers who share our concept of vol-
untary obligation disagree widely in their answers to these questions. In 
the rest of the paper, I will review two such theories – the natural right 
theory and the social practice theory – and ask whether either of them 
provides any rationale for supposing that a promise (or an order) can only 
supplement and not countermand our prior obligations. 
 
2. The Natural Right Theory: Conflicting Promises 
 
According to the natural right theory, promises involve our exercise of a 
natural (pre-conventional) power to change the normative situation by 
declaration, a power that is rooted in a natural right to determine how we 
ourselves shall behave. Take my promise to have lunch with you today. I 
start off with the natural right to have lunch with you or not as I please. 
At a minimum, this means that I am at liberty to lunch with you (or not), 
i.e., I can lunch with you (or not) without wronging you or anyone else. 
Having promised to lunch with you, I have lost that aspect of my liberty 
in that I cannot fail to have lunch with you without wronging at least you. 
Many natural right theorists claim that there is a transfer of right here, that 
my power to bind myself has been acquired by you: you now have the 
power to determine whether I would be wronging you by failing to show 
up in that you can release me from my promise or else hold me to it. The 
notion that there is a literal transfer here – that some normative item that 
used to be the promisor’s is now the promisee’s – is questionable (Owens 
2014: 79-81). My interest is in the more fundamental idea that the power 
to promise is grounded in the promisor’s prior natural liberty to do what 
they are promising to do, and I shall use “natural right theory” to denote 
this claim. 12 
The natural right theory makes room for what I called voluntary ob-
ligation: it gives us a power to determine who is obliged to do what simp-
ly by declaring our choices in this matter, but it also limits the scope of 
this power in a way that might be thought to preclude the creation of 
conflicting obligations. If our power over obligation can operate only in 
areas of liberty, only in regions that are currently free of obligation, then 
it looks as if we cannot, by exercising that power, create conflicting obli-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Reinach holds that we have a natural power to make a binding to promise to commit 
murder, etc. – a power that is not grounded in any natural right to do the thing we are 
promising to do. He also distinguishes the power to promise from the power to transfer 
a right (Reinach 1983/1913: 45-48 and 66-67). 
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gations for ourselves. 13 Or so it might appear. In the event, most natural 
right theorists adopt a more nuanced approach. 
We find a relatively clear statement of the natural right theory in 
Grotius, who, like many authors of the period, is a transfer theorist. He 
thinks of our (natural) rights and liberties as things that we (naturally) 
own and compares a promise to the alienation of an item of property: 
 
And this is a compleat promise, as having the same effect as the alienation of a 
man’s property. For it is either the introduction to the alienating of a thing, or 
the alienation of some part of our liberty. To the former belong our promises 
to give, to the latter our promises to do something (Grotius 2005/1625: 704). 
 
This passage raises many questions, but I want to focus on one issue: 
does the natural right theory imply that you cannot make a binding prom-
ise to do that which you are not at liberty to do?  
This is what Grotius says:  
 
To make a promise firm, it is requisite that the thing promised either now is, or 
may be, in the power of the promisor; wherefore in the first place, it is certain, 
that no promise can oblige us to do that, which is in itself unlawful; for no man 
has a power to do any such thing, or can have. But a promise … receives its 
force from the power of the promisor, nor does it reach any farther.14 
 
The waters are muddied by the phrase “in itself unlawful.” Grotius ap-
pears to be distinguishing a promise to do what is not intrinsically im-
permissible from a promise to do what is intrinsically impermissible. My 
having lunch with you is not intrinsically impermissible, while our feast-
ing on human flesh is. I suspect Grotius is inviting us to conclude that, 
while I cannot promise to share a cannibal lunch with you, I can make 
conflicting social arrangements and so I might after all make a binding 
promise that can be fulfilled only by wronging someone.15  
Not all transfer theorists concede this possibility. For Hobbes, there 
is no such thing as an intrinsically impermissible act. All Hobbesian obli-
gations originate in a promise and so impermissibility is always extrinsic. 
Hobbes furthermore insists that binding promises cannot conflict so con-
flict of obligation as such is impossible. Recent natural right theorists like 
Shiffrin and Watson are less blank, drawing a Grotian distinction between 
promises to do something intrinsically immoral – promises they deem 
invalid – and conflicting promises that are sometimes valid. But before 
assessing these recent views, let us consider Hobbes more closely. 
 
A former covenant makes void a later. For a man that hath passed away his 
right to one man today, hath it not to pass tomorrow to another; and therefore 
the later promise passeth no right, but is null.16 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 If the natural right theorist requires that the promisor have not just a liberty but also a 
claim to do what they are promising to do, then conflicts between obligations taken on 
by different people may also be avoided. 
14 Grotius (2005/1625: 714). See also Locke (1988/1689: 284). 
15 This may also be the best way to interpret what Rosati says on the matter (2011: 128-
29). As Rosati notes, I myself took something like this view in earlier work: see n. 3. 
16 Hobbes (1994/1651: 86). Pufendorf (2003/1673: 118) says the same. 
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Here are two claims: first, that it is impossible to make binding 
promises that conflict – only one such promise can bind; second, that 
where I attempt to make conflicting promises, it is the prior promise that 
binds. 17 I will take the latter claim first.  
Hobbes assumes that, where one is obliged to do something, one 
ought to do it. Now, when faced with conflicting promises, it is very of-
ten the case that I ought to fulfill one of them and not the other but it is 
not generally true that the promise I ought to fulfill is the one I made first 
(Thomson 1990: 89). Suppose I promised to have lunch with you and 
later promised to help John move house at the same time. Here I may 
have forgotten my earlier promise when I made the later one, but equally 
I may not: perhaps I just ignored my earlier promise in the light of John’s 
need for help. Still, it might be that I ought to break my social engage-
ment with you in order to help John move house. The fact that I first 
agreed to meet you for lunch doubtless counts for something, but the 
fact that John will not be able to move at all unless I help out counts for 
more. I ought to break the prior promise I made to you. Thus, Hobbes 
cannot maintain that only the earlier promise binds.  
Might Hobbes simply abandon the idea that prior promises nullify 
their successors – allowing that a later promise can invalidate an earlier – 
while maintaining that both promises cannot bind, that you cannot sur-
render your liberty in favor of both parties?18 In determining what to do 
tomorrow at lunchtime, I may reflect that my later promise was more sol-
emn than my earlier, that the costs of breach are greater and so forth. 
Perhaps I cannot entirely get myself off the hook of having lunch with 
you just by solemnly agreeing to meet another – I still owe you an expla-
nation, a free lunch and so forth. But, one may think, I no longer have a 
promissory obligation to lunch precisely because of my subsequent prom-
ise.  
Unfortunately, the marks of an obligatory lunch remain. First, it 
would still make sense for me to have lunch with you simply because I 
promised to have lunch with you. This would be the wrong thing to do 
and likely involve a display of weakness on my part, but it would hardly 
be an unintelligible act. Furthermore, it would make sense for me to ig-
nore (say) my own convenience in deciding which promise to keep, to 
exclude such considerations from deliberation. Finally, it would be ap-
propriate for me to feel guilty about any breach of promise and to seek 
your forgiveness, not simply to express regret.  
The last point merits expansion. Suppose you have a limited quantity 
of a lifesaving drug to distribute among a group of sick people with 
whom you have no prior connection. All are equally deserving but not all 
can be saved. Here you bitterly regret having to decide who lives and who 
dies. You may also wish that this task had fallen to someone else or, more 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Pink (2009: 404-6) argues that the transfer theorist is (implausibly) committed to both 
claims. Shiffrin (2011: 163-65) denies this. 
18 Perhaps a later property transfer can also invalidate an earlier one, provided delivery 
(i.e., performance) has not yet occurred. 
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charitably, that nature would take the matter out of your hands. Once the 
choice is made, you will (quite reasonably) feel awful about the resulting 
deaths, not just qua compassionate observer but as someone who brought 
those deaths about, feelings not fully assuaged by your confidence that 
you made the right choice. Still, in so far as you are convinced that you 
did the right thing, you will not think of yourself as having wronged those 
who died and so you will not feel guilt. You might well ask for their un-
derstanding but not for their forgiveness. 
Now, suppose that you actually promised the drug to one group of 
people. You then discover to your horror that more lives may be saved 
by giving it to another previously unknown group. Even if you are con-
vinced that you should save the greater number, does your promise not 
affect how you would think and feel about what you must now do? (After 
all, using the drug to save other lives is exactly what this promise was 
meant to exclude.) Would you not vastly prefer that you had not made 
this promise at all? True, you would feel awful about having to deny the 
drug to anybody, but when reallocating the drug involves a breach of 
promise there is a further element of distress, one that registers the fact 
that you are now (albeit justifiably) wronging those people. The distress 
here is not just a deeper regret, as if you had discovered that the group 
who must be sacrificed is larger than you thought. It is a feeling of a dif-
ferent sort, one that looks for forgiveness. A less biting form of the same 
feeling is apt when you stand one person up to go help another because 
you promised to help.  
Grotius says that we cannot be bound by a promise unless it is in our 
power to keep it, and this might be taken to imply that moral necessity is 
as much of a shield against guilt as physical necessity (Foot 2002: 43-44, 
48-49). On this view, if I cannot keep the promise because I must save 
the lives of others, then it is just as if some physical incapacity prevents 
me from keeping my promise. Were this so, I should be indifferent be-
tween a situation in which I must choose to break a promise to some in 
order to save the lives of others and a situation in which nature forces my 
hand. Yet, I am far from indifferent: nature’s intervention relieves the 
guilt of breach of promise in a way that mere moral necessity (like saving 
more lives) never could. Though moral necessity justifies a breach of 
promise, it does not dissolve the obligation to keep it, nor relieve the 
burden of guilt at breach. 
Given all this, the following question arises: when one breaches such 
an obligation, what is the significance for one’s relations with other peo-
ple of the fact that one is justified in breaching it? We are supposing that 
such a justification does not abolish the obligation and that we are, for 
instance, still wronging the promisee by breaching our promise. So does it 
matter to anything other than our regard for our own practical rationality 
whether we are also justified in breaching it? People standardly offer a 
justification as a way of shielding themselves from blame and where one’s 
breach of promise is justified this does indeed mean that one should not 
be blamed, even by the promisee. That is usually why people wish to be 
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justified in what they do – they thereby deflect this form of criticism.19 
However, it remains the case that you have wronged the promisee and 
might well ask for their forgiveness. That request makes sense because it 
is still appropriate to feel guilty about breach of promise, even when 
blame would be out of place because your breach is justified. To ask for 
forgiveness is not just to express regret, it is to seek to relieve yourself of 
the burden of guilt (Owens 2012, section 17). 
The natural right theorist should acknowledge that promissory obli-
gations can conflict where we overcommit ourselves. Still, our voluntary 
obligations might at least be constrained by our involuntary obligations. 
In the next section, we will address this further issue. 
 
3. The Natural Right Theory: Wicked Promises 
 
Natural right theorists (Hobbes excepted) are agreed that there is a cer-
tain class of intrinsically impermissible acts, acts that one is not at liberty 
to perform and therefore cannot make a binding promise to perform. A 
promise to help rob a bank will serve as an instance of what might be 
called call a wicked promise, i.e., a promise to do something that is intrin-
sically (and so involuntarily) impermissible.20 Later on, I will confess to a 
lack of clarity about “intrinsic impermissibility” and thus about the notion 
of a wicked promise, but for the moment let us assume that we under-
stand it.21 
Presumably, one is obliged not to rob banks. Can one nonetheless 
acquire a voluntary obligation to rob a particular bank? Specifically, might 
one not have a promissory obligation to rob this bank, a promise one is 
(involuntarily) obliged not to fulfill?22 To settle this question, we should 
look for the marks of obligation noted earlier. Could it make sense for 
me to drive the getaway car simply because I had freely promised to do 
so, had not been released, etc.? And could it make sense for me to ex-
clude consideration of, say, personal risk from my deliberations about 
whether to keep my promise? On the face on it, the answer is yes: I sol-
emnly bound myself to an immoral enterprise and so I feel that I must 
follow through, its immorality notwithstanding. I may well be wrong 
about what I ought to do, but I am neither incoherent nor robotic. Con-
siderations other than the promise itself may count in favor of keeping it. 
Perhaps I know that, without a good getaway driver, my accomplices are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 And deflect it in a way that (unlike excuse) does not impugn their rationality. 
20 We can illustrate the same issue with much more mundane examples. Suppose the 
philosophy department ought to know that there is very little chance of our getting a 
new line, but I have promised the chair (who wishes to keep up morale) that I will not 
tell anyone. Can I be bound by this promise? 
21 I have already noted one reason for treating this notion with caution – namely the 
ambiguity of “permissibility” (see n. 6). In this section, I will be expressing reservations 
about the idea of intrinsic impermissibility. 
22 Here it is unlikely that one’s promise will justify one’s fulfilling it, but that is only be-
cause the interests the involuntary obligation protects are so weighty. Presumably, I also 
have an involuntary obligation not to shove you aside as I rush to the bus stop, but a 
sufficiently serious promise might well justify such behavior. 
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liable to be caught up in a bloody battle and this prospect is by itself 
enough to get me to participate in the bank raid. But the thought of such 
further consequences is not needed to make sense of my fulfilling the 
promise, and in any case my sense of responsibility for them turns largely 
on the fact that these consequences would be caused by my breach of 
promise.  
The other mark of obligation may also be present. If I do not show 
up for the raid, it might well be apt for me to feel guilty about letting my 
accomplices down. True, a decent person would be unlikely to focus their 
emotional attention on the wrong of breach rather than on the wrong 
avoided by breach, but one who is simply indifferent to the fact that they 
made the promise, and to the reactions the breach of it provokes, would 
not be admired. A certain emotional ambivalence is usually called for: 
remorse about making and then breaking the arrangement as well as relief 
that you did not follow through on it. Again, it might be thought that 
your guilt must be focused on the adverse consequences of breach, but 
this need not be so (as when there are no consequences23) and where you 
do pay attention to consequences, you impute them to yourself largely 
because you promised. Those who must disappoint other people’s expec-
tations feel much better about doing so where these expectations were 
not aroused by a promise. 
While insisting that a wicked promise does not bind, recent natural 
right theorists tend to concede that the promisor often behaves badly in 
breaching a wicked promise and that this badness need not be a function 
solely of the further consequences of breach. True, they must insist that 
guilt at breach is out of place whenever it is my scruples that lead me to 
back out of the bank raid, but if I fail to show up and drive the getaway 
car simply because I get cold feet and bottle out, guilt at breach remains 
apt. One might wonder whether shame rather than guilt would be the 
right reaction to a display of cowardice that supposedly wrongs no one. 
Be that as it may, this suggestion will not work. Suppose my accomplices 
come to realize that I am a bit of a coward and so not a very good pro-
spect as a getaway driver. Once I show signs of backing out, they decide 
that I am not worth the trouble and release me from my promise before I 
breach. That should be a relief to me: I have avoided a guilt-worthy act. 
Yet this act cannot be the supposed wrong, already committed, of mani-
festing my cowardice; it must instead be the wrong of manifesting it by 
actually breaking faith with them. But why would that act have been a 
further wrong unless I was bound by my promise? 
Shiffrin suggests that one who makes a wicked promise instead 
commits a wrong of misrepresentation: they represent themselves as 
hereby taking on an obligation that they could not possibly be taking on. 
Note this wrong is not meant to depend on my accomplices being misled 
for they may happen to agree with Shiffrin that I cannot bind myself to 
rob a bank and so are not deceived. Still, Shiffrin maintains, there is 
something wrong about my so representing myself. This view raises vari-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Foot concedes that were there no adverse effects, we might still feel “a distress that 
we thought rational” at the breach of a solemn promise (Foot 2002: 47). 
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ous questions: what sort of wrong is this (a wrong of insincerity?) and 
who (if anyone) is wronged by it? But we need not settle these issues in 
order to see that Shiffrin’s proposal cannot resolve the present difficulty. 
Suppose (once more) that having made my dishonest promise to rob the 
bank, I am released from it before I have the chance to breach. If Shiffrin 
is right, I must still feel bad about having misrepresented my moral pow-
ers but the situation has changed to my advantage. My culpability is re-
duced because there is a further wrong that I can no longer commit, 
namely the wrong of breach, a wrong distinct from any wrong of misrep-
resentation. How could this be so unless my promise bound me? 
Thus far I have been taking for granted that we can spot a wicked 
promise when we see one, but in fact the notion of an intrinsically im-
permissible act needs elucidation. Emptying a bank vault is not intrinsi-
cally impermissible, nor is sticking a knife into someone; the promises of 
security truck companies and surgeons often bind. Perhaps “theft” and 
“assault” are intrinsically impermissible but such notions are not needed 
to capture the intended content of many a wicked promise. Should you 
promise to “rob a bank” for me, I would not normally complain if it 
turned out that the bank’s money was somehow free for the taking. On 
the contrary, I would be rather pleased that you managed to fulfill your 
promise by removing the money from the bank without having to rob it. 
Only if the theft were part of an anarchist project would I require you to 
rob the bank. I assume the natural right theorist thinks of ordinary crimi-
nal conspiracies (and not just anarchist plots) as involving wicked prom-
ises. So how exactly are they going to pick out the class of promises that 
are meant to be invalid simply in virtue of their content? 
The natural right theorist must weaken the notion of a wicked prom-
ise so as to include promises to do what is only contingently impermissi-
ble but without deeming invalid all promises to do the contingently im-
permissible (otherwise, conflicting promissory obligations would also be 
ruled out). In an effort to invalidate a normal criminal promise to rob a 
bank while also allowing for conflict of voluntary obligation, it might be 
maintained that a promise is invalid whenever it is envisaged that the ful-
fillment of that promise will wrong someone. Envisaged by whom? It 
cannot be the promisor doing the envisaging, otherwise it would be im-
possible for someone to knowingly make conflicting promises that both 
bind in the way described in the last section. It can only be the promisee. 
This is indeed the line taken by Thomson and endorsed by Watson but it 
is hard to see how switching our focus from the promisor’s faults to the 
promisee’s will help.24  
Both Thomson and Watson assume, along with almost all natural 
right theorists, that a binding promise (like a gift) must be accepted by the 
promisee.25 Thomson then suggests that, where a wicked promise is inva-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Thomson (1990: 314-15) and Watson (2009: 176-77). 
25 Grotius, Hobbes and Pufendorf all require acceptance. See also Thomson (1990: 302) 
and Watson (2009: 156-57). Shiffrin (2008: 491-93) is the exception. She does not con-
sider Thomson’s proposal and (I assume) would not endorse it. It is unclear to me how 
Shiffrin would distinguish promises to do something “inherently immoral” from prom-
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lid, this is because the promisee was “at fault” for accepting it. On this 
basis, Thomson maintains that a promise to participate in a terrorist plot 
is not binding, yet Thomson also allows that if one promises to lend 
someone a book and later discovers that it is owned by a third party, the 
promise still binds even though it could be fulfilled only by stealing the 
book. A likely difference between these cases is that the addressee of the 
book-loan promise might not have known that the promisor could fulfill 
it only by wronging someone, while one who accepts a confederate’s 
promise to participate in a terrorist plot could hardly fail to realize that its 
execution may involve killing people. Hence, Thomson concludes, the 
acceptance of the latter promise but not of the former is illicit.  
But is the promisee really “at fault” for accepting a promise simply 
because they know that the fulfillment of this promise will likely involve 
wronging someone? Working out how to keep the promise is usually the 
promisor’s business. Suppose A needs the loan of C’s book a great deal 
more than B does. A asks C for the book, C demurs and soon after 
agrees to lend it to the more charming B instead. Can A not go to C be-
fore C hands over the book and seek a promise that the book will be 
loaned to them after all, even though they know such a promise can be 
fulfilled only if C wrongs B by breaching their previous promise? Cannot 
A take the view that C ought not to have promised the book to B in the 
first place and so the ensuing snafu is entirely C’s responsibility?26 It cer-
tainly looks as though any promise C makes to A on this point would be 
valid, even though A knows perfectly well that it can be fulfilled only by 
wronging B. Were it said that this is only because the promised act is not 
“intrinsically impermissible,” we should ask once more what that involves 
beyond foreseeable wrongness. 
It is often unclear how a promise is going to be fulfilled but that fact 
alone need not prevent us from accepting it. Suppose you volunteer to be 
my best man even though, as we both know, you will be spending the 
year in Australia. I wonder aloud how you will manage the expense of 
travel and your other commitments to work and family. Nevertheless, 
you insist and I accept your promise. Have I done wrong? Must I have 
good grounds for believing that you have secretly worked out some way 
of reconciling all these conflicting demands on your time and money? 
When you later try to back out, I might be unsurprised but still annoyed. 
Perhaps I am obliged to release you from the promise, perhaps not; either 
way, release is needed otherwise the promise binds. You cannot get out 
of it simply by claiming that I should not have accepted your offer in the 
first place.  
It looks as if the natural right theory fails on its own terms in that it 
draws no plausible line between the wicked promises that are supposedly 
invalidated by the immorality of their content and those that are not. This 
failure suggests that there may be no such line, that the sheer impermissi-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
ises one cannot fulfill without wronging someone but which are nevertheless valid 
(Shiffrin 2011: 164-65). 
26 Here C may or may not have wronged A by not lending them the book in the first 
place. That sort of thing need not affect the validity of C’s promise to B. 
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bility of what you are promising to do never by itself invalidates your 
promise. But drawing that conclusion would be a little hasty: the fault 
may instead lie with the natural right theory itself. Will it help to change 
our intellectual framework? In the next section, I shall consider how the 
issues raised by wicked and conflicting promises look against the back-
ground of a rather different theoretical approach, though one that, like 
the natural right theory, treats promissory obligation as the product of an 
exercise of normative power. 
 
4. Social Practice Theories 
 
On the natural right theory, we have the power to promise because we 
have the natural right to control our own lives and the ability to bind our-
selves is as natural as the right of self-control from which it derives: nei-
ther the right nor the power depends for its existence on whether it hap-
pens to be recognized or respected, on whether it is embodied in an insti-
tution like the law or in some more informal social practice. According to 
an opposing tradition, promissory obligation is conventional: it exists on-
ly where the power to promise is recognized and its exercise treated as 
binding the promisor. I shall not go into what recognition of a power to 
promise involves except to rehearse our three marks of obligation. Where 
there is a social practice of promising, agents will tend to think that it 
makes sense to do something simply because they have promised to do it, 
to exclude certain considerations from their deliberations about whether 
to do it and will tend to feel guilty if they do not. Furthermore, both 
promisees and bystanders will think it right to blame them for the breach. 
How is the establishment and maintenance of a practice of promis-
ing to be justified? Given that its rules bind us only when justified, this 
amounts to asking: under what circumstances do the rules of such a prac-
tice actually bind us? One answer goes as follows: the practice is to be 
justified by the interests that it serves.27 That general formula leaves much 
scope for variation. On the most familiar way of filling it out, the exist-
ence of a practice of taking promises seriously has various desirable con-
sequences. For example, where people are inclined to keep the promises 
they make, to blame those who breach and so forth, society has fash-
ioned an extremely useful device of social coordination and it is the bene-
fits of having such a device that ensure that those who make promises are 
obliged to keep them.28 Approaching the issue in this way, how should we 
think about both conflicting promises and wicked promises? 
Can conflicting promises bind? On the present approach, that looks 
like an issue that cannot be resolved a priori for it all depends on the costs 
and benefits of various normative systems. One might take the line that, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 There has been a vigorous debate over what more is required to ensure that we are 
bound to comply with the rules of a desirable practice: perhaps the benefits and burdens 
created by compliance with its rules must be fairly distributed among the affected par-
ties; perhaps the parties must also agree to shoulder its burdens or at least do nothing to 
avoid receiving its benefits. For further discussion, see Rawls (1999: 93-99 and 301-8), 
Nozick (1974: 90-95) and Scanlon (1998: 338-42). 
28	  Hume (1978/1738-40, book 3, part 2).	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when finding oneself “committed” to being in two places at the same 
time, one should simply weigh all the relevant interests and do what 
seems best without remorse. On this view, the significance of obligation 
lies purely in its role in determining what one ought to do and any “con-
flict of obligation” may be resolved by sound deliberation. But we need 
to acknowledge a broader range of human interests. People do not just 
have an interest in what will be done but also (a) in what it makes sense 
to do, (b) in how it makes sense to conduct deliberation and (c) in wheth-
er blame, guilt, etc. are apt reactions to what is done or to how delibera-
tion is conducted. And, I would argue, the point of promising (and other 
normative powers) is to give them some control over these things. 
Our interest in (a), (b) and (c) might still be purely instrumental. For 
example, it might be that guilty feelings even in people who justifiably 
broke their promises are apt only where they make it more likely that 
those people will keep other promises that ought to be kept. And tenden-
cies to exclude otherwise relevant considerations from deliberation might 
be justified in a similar fashion (i.e., as maximizing the probability that 
you will conform with all of the relevant reasons across the whole range 
of cases). On this basis, we can argue that, by recognizing genuine con-
flicts of obligation (i.e., conflicts that cannot be resolved simply by set-
tling what you ought to do), a system of promissory obligations serves 
our interest in social co-ordination. Again, it is a contingent matter which 
set of rules best promotes social coordination (and the other interests at 
stake) and therefore a contingent matter whether a binding system of 
rules should recognize conflicts of obligation, and the same applies to 
cases in which only one of the conflicting obligations is the product of a 
promise. The logic of obligation will not settle these questions for us.29 
We can illustrate the approach to conflict of obligation that I just as-
sociated with social practice theories by considering “wicked commands.” 
These raise issues analogous to those raised by so-called wicked promises 
but they arise in a context in which the conventional nature of the obliga-
tions involved is much less controversial. Few people think that political 
or military authorities have a natural power of command. Some maintain 
that the basis of their authority lies in promise or consent but, on the cur-
rently most popular view, their authority derives from the desirable con-
sequences of granting them the relevant power of command. This au-
thority might also serve the commander’s personal interests but the func-
tion of the relevant social structure is not to serve their personal interests.  
When a social authority (say a military officer) issues a command, 
they seek to impose an obligation on their subordinates and they do so 
precisely by declaring their intention of hereby imposing this obligation. 
Given this, it is natural to compare promises that require the violation of 
some (other) obligation with commands that require the violation of 
some (other) obligation and to ask whether our authority to make and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 On the last point I part company with Gilbert and Searle who affirm the validity of all 
these promises a priori, while allowing that the question of whether you ought to keep 
them remains open (Searle 2001: 193-94; Gilbert 2006: 143-64 and 227-34). Neither 
Gilbert nor Searle appeals to the distinctive interests that promising serves. 
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accept promises is limited in whatever way an authority’s ability to issue 
binding orders is limited. With any social authority, we must settle the 
scope of its authority. On the one hand, a military officer is entitled to 
order their troops into battle. If they issue such an order, and the troops 
fail to obey, the troops are violating an obligation. The order may be fool-
ish enough that the troops are justified in disobeying (all things consid-
ered), but even so they often remain under an obligation to obey. Given 
this, it would make sense for them to obey, to exclude consideration of 
their personal safety from their deliberations about whether to obey and 
to feel guilty about not obeying. On the other hand, should an officer 
order one of their soldiers to marry a particular person or to sell their 
(private) car, this order is simply ultra vires and void ab initio.  
Might wicked orders and wicked promises not be invalid because ul-
tra vires?30 The point of recognizing powers of command within a military 
hierarchy is not to serve the interests of those individuals to whom such 
powers are assigned. Rather, the organization as a whole has (we sup-
pose) a worthwhile social purpose, a purpose best discharged if certain 
individuals are given the power to issue instructions to others. Here it is 
important that these instructions be sources of obligation, excluding vari-
ous considerations recommending disobedience from the deliberations of 
the subordinate. The conscientious soldier will not treat an officer’s 
command as one factor to weigh against all the other costs and benefits 
of the proposed action in determining what they should do. Rather, they 
will exclude a range of factors (including for instance their personal safe-
ty) from their deliberations about whether to obey and often will not de-
liberate at all, at least about whether rather than how to obey. This all seems 
sensible where the organization works best if the subordinate does not 
second-guess the superior’s deliberations but simply acts as if the superior 
had already correctly weighed all the relevant practical considerations (Raz 
1999: 40-45, 62-65). 
On this model of military discipline, it is clear why certain orders will 
be simply ultra vires. The needs of the military are not served by giving an 
officer authority over whom their soldiers marry or over what car they 
own. On these matters, the soldiers should act in accordance with their 
own views of all the relevant considerations. But I doubt that a general 
invalidation of orders to commit “impermissible” acts can be supported 
in the same way. The realm of the morally dubious (like that of the tacti-
cally inadvisable) is broad and includes many matters crucial to the effec-
tive functioning of an army. Suppose, for example, that an officer orders 
a soldier to commandeer a private vehicle for military purposes. A rea-
sonable soldier might well doubt whether he ought to do this but, as it 
seems to me, a reasonable soldier might also set these doubts aside simply 
because they have been ordered to do it by someone in authority over 
them.  
There are limits to the scope of the exclusion here: when ordered to 
kill a large number of innocent civilians, the soldier must take a view 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Altham (1985: 4-7) assumes that wicked commands do not bind and suggests that 
wicked promises are equally invalid.  
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about whether such killing can be justified – no reasonable soldier could 
regard this matter as none of their concern. (Perhaps there are also cases 
– the Charge of the Light Brigade? – in which tactical idiocy invalidates 
an order.) The limits of the exclusion are set by the legitimate purposes of 
the organization and will vary from social context to social context. 
Doubtless the interests that ensure that an act breaches some obligation 
will on occasion also suffice to ensure the invalidation of any instruction 
to commit that act. But no viable military organization could countenance 
the invalidation of an order just because a soldier reasonably thinks that it 
requires them to breach another obligation, even if they happen to be 
right. Some social organizations (a football team perhaps) can serve their 
function without requiring you to do such things but an army is not one 
of them: the scope of arguable “impermissibility” is just too broad.  
Back to promises. Promisors and promisees make and accept prom-
ises on a huge range of matters – there are not the restricted spheres of 
competence one finds in a special-purpose social hierarchy like the army. 
According to most social practice theories, a practice of promising is to 
be justified by the beneficial consequences of the existence of the practice 
and, in particular, the role of the practice as an aid to social coordination. 
That promises have such a generic function would account for the ab-
sence of any sphere of competence restricting the making of promises. I 
would argue that people have another generic interest, an interest in being 
able to control the rights and obligations of themselves and of those 
around them and that they value such control for its own sake. In par-
ticular, promisees have an interest in being able to determine by declara-
tion whether the promisor is obliged to keep their promise. This norma-
tive control (or authority) interest is distinct from our interest in achieving 
social coordination (Owens 2012, ch. 6). A practice of promising serves 
the authority interest directly by giving people the power to make and ac-
cept promises and so, on this view, the value of the whole practice is no 
longer purely instrumental. 
I maintain that it is this authority interest rather than an interest in 
social coordination that fixes the rules of the practice of promising and in 
particular determines the status of conflicting promises and of wicked 
promises. The validity of these promises will thus depend on whether our 
interest in being able to bind others to performance extends to cases in 
which they are already obliged to do the opposite. To settle this question, 
we need not speculate about the wider social effects of acknowledging 
conflicting obligations; rather, we should reflect on what we value about 
(promissory) obligation and control over it. I leave it open what such an 
inquiry might yield.31 It may be that what some obligations require us to 
do is so abhorrent that there can be no (noninstrumental) value in having 
the power to create such an obligation. On the other hand, supposing 
promisees have a general interest in being able to bind others to perfor-
mance, it is hard to see why that should not extend to some cases in which 
the promisor is already obliged to do the opposite (consider the book-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 For some thoughts on this, see Owens (2012: 249). 
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loan example from the last section, for instance). If so, there can be no 
edict of invalidation covering all such promises. 
We need not choose between the various accounts of promissory 
obligation considered in this paper in order to reach some general con-
clusions about promises and conflicts of obligation. In the first section, 
we noted indications that people are bound by promises to do things that 
they are obliged (either voluntarily or involuntarily) not to do. Embold-
ened by some theory of promise, one might respond that people are 
wrong to feel guilty about breach of such a promise or confused in think-
ing that it makes sense to keep it. But the application of several accounts 
of promissory obligation has failed to overturn these indications, and has 
failed to provide a clear theoretical rationale for invalidating all such 
promises. Given that, we should take these indications at face value and 
allow that promises to do what we are obliged not to do can bind.32 
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32 Many thanks to audiences at Princeton University, Humboldt University, Georgetown 
University and Cambridge University and to Daniel Viehoff for comments on earlier 
versions of this paper. 
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